Key points:
- A weak property market is weighing on China’s recovery, and more stimulus is likely.
- China’s growth is maturing and becoming more cyclical, however new opportunities are also emerging.
- On the geopolitical front, the market seems to price this risk purely from a China perspective, but can the West realistically decouple from China without significant cost?
- Exposure to China is not without risk, but valuations are low even assuming a very tough economic outcome.
- Antipodes remains patient with the recovery, while having a preference towards emerging multinationals and areas where the recovery is accelerating.
There’s no denying China’s re-opening revival has lost some of its initial steam.
The lack of stimulus during lockdown helps to explain the more muted post-COVID recovery relative to the West – specifically, delaying the recovery of low and middle income households. Moreover, the consumer has also been weaker than expected due to a lacklustre property market weighing on confidence.
The weak rebound has also impacted business confidence and decisions to invest, expand and hire. Recovery to employment has been slow given small – medium enterprises account for 80% of job creation. Youth unemployment is 20%.
The property sector is likely to remain a drag over the next few years as excess inventory continues to be worked through the system. At the peak in 2019, new starts (new sales which take around three years to build) hovered around 16m units versus our estimate of real underlying demand at closer to 11m units p.a. on a forward-looking basis. We’re now seeing a normalisation, with new starts down to 9m units in 2022. This 40% decline will act as a drag on GDP growth into 2024, but with the impact front loaded.
Additionally, the number of cities where inventory had built to worrying levels has meaningfully receded, and the cities where inventory has fallen in-line with average levels are exhibiting a faster rebound in economic activity.
Non-financial corporate debt is already high at 170% of GDP, though household debt is in line with the developed world (c. 60% of GDP) and mortgage rates have fallen to 14-year lows. Policy makers have not responded with big-bang stimulus like they have done in past to avoid adding to existing system imbalances. Instead, the focus has been on reducing borrowing costs, but this hasn’t boosted credit demand given confidence is low and the property market isn’t the one-way bet it once was.
But amid all of this, there is cause for optimism.
Excess household savings amassed during lockdown represents close to 15% of a normal year’s consumption, and pockets of the service sector have rebounded back to pre-COVID trend levels (such as travel and entertainment).
What’s our view?
The data bears close monitoring but at this stage it points to a slower recovery as opposed to no recovery at all.
A lack of improvement in the domestic economy or further weakening in the global economy (and the impact to China’s exports) should see policy makers push the stimulus pedal. There’s meaningful firepower to act, inflation is very low (+0.2% yoy), and there’s a real risk of social instability if the labour market fails to recover further.
The focus of stimulus has shifted from roads and bridges to consumption and energy transition. For example, policy makers have recently announced tax savings for EV purchases in 2024-2025.
The key point is that more policy easing has the potential to support a cyclical recovery.
Structural headwinds
China is indeed facing longer-term headwinds to growth. A structurally smaller property sector, a more disciplined approach to fiscal spending, rising levels of debt, aging population and a more challenging geopolitical backdrop are all challenges to China’s longer-term growth profile.
There are, however, offsets to some of these forces such as rising levels of consumption as households spend more as the social safety net improves, as well as new areas of investment in renewables and other important industries that will represent attractive opportunities e.g. shifting up the manufacturing curve with a focus on owning more IP along the value chain, technology/AI.
We are seeing a real shift from “Made in China” (products made by foreign firms in China) to “Made by China” (products made by Chinese firms). For example, Chinese homegrown suppliers now develop and manufacture critical components for the iPhone 14 that account for one-quarter of the total bill of materials. This compares to just $6, or 3%, of the value of an iPhone4 in 2010 which related to assembly. These Chinese companies are now exporting to low wage countries in South-East Asia for final assembly.
There are other examples. Midea is the largest air-con manufacturer globally alongside Japan’s Daikin. Contemporary Amperex Technology Co (CATL) is the largest EV battery company in the world – manufacturing more than one-third of all EV batteries globally, and BYD is hot on Tesla’s heels to be the largest producer of battery electric vehicles globally.
While we see China’s growth rate falling to 4 – 5% p.a. (which is still meaningfully higher than the developed world) there are new opportunities even as China’s overall economic growth matures and becomes more cyclical.
On the topic of geopolitical competition between the two superpowers, the market seems to price this risk purely from a China perspective. The global economy is more integrated than ever with China contributing c. 15% of global trade which begs the question, can the West really decouple from China? Any strategy to cut China out of the developed world would not only be incredibly difficult but also very costly. Splintering the global economy and replicating existing supply chains is inefficient and inflationary.
So, yes, the US will continue to push towards on-shoring/near-shoring but the cost of doing so will likely limit this to leading edge/strategic technology. At the same time the West will try and limit China’s access to the same critical technologies. In this respect China also has cards to play given its dominance of critical supply chains such as rare earths, EV’s, etc. Accordingly, we see a multipolar world evolving where China is well-positioned to take market share. China is increasingly looking toward the developing world which accounts for more than 40% of global GDP, a material growing demand opportunity.
The risk to this view is that communication between the US and China breaks down further. This is a classic case of ‘prisoner’s dilemma’. Without communication both sides will fear what the other is scheming which can result in outcomes that are bad for all parties.
We aren’t saying geopolitics isn’t an issue. It is. But our view remains that pragmatism can prevail between the major powers, and the question is whether the outcome is as binary as what is priced into markets today.
The bottom line
At around 10x 12 month forward P/E (MSCI China), China valuations are discounting a very high level of geopolitical risk and a tough economic outcome.
We remain patient with the recovery, with a preference for emerging multinationals that benefit from the developing multipolar world – like Midea, mentioned earlier in this newsletter – as well as areas where the recovery is accelerating. Galaxy Entertainment is a good example of this.
Stock in Focus: Galaxy Entertainment Group (HKG: 0027)
Galaxy Entertainment is a leading integrated resort operator in Macau. Significant pent-up demand in travel and leisure versus other consumption categories has seen a sharp recovery in mass gaming to pre-COVID levels. The demise of junket operators, the 10-year extension to gaming licences, as well as no new approvals for gaming tables in Macau provide a positive backdrop, and the company is poised to take market share as it has the largest pipeline of hotel developments over the coming years relative to peers. The stock is priced at 13x forward EV/EBITDA.

By the Antipodes Investment Team


