Watch Antipodes’ Jacob Mitchell unpack why pragmatic value is one of the most overlooked diversifiers – and why the market is already proving him right.
Transcript
I wanted to give just a brief introduction in terms of how we’re seeing markets. First of all, I think many of you will have seen this slide before. It’s just the level of concentration that we see in the benchmark. And why we think that’s important is it means there’s so much money today that’s crowded into passive, crowded into core, crowded into systematic. And that’s fine. And a lot of the justification for that is being very tracking error aware as the key measure of risk. Well, we think there’s a measure of risk that is being ignored in client portfolios, and that is simply the value at risk that’s in the benchmark.
What’s driving the performance of the benchmark? It’s no surprise. We have on the right-hand side here, it’s all about US exceptionalism. It’s quality, although quality has had recent headwinds. Momentum, mega cap and the AI enabler trade. So it’s the semiconductor winners of the buildout of AI infrastructure. Things that are under-represented in the benchmark are on the left there, which is — let’s call it — small midcap stocks, Europe, emerging markets, value as a factor and what we call the AI adopters, the companies that are ultimately going to benefit from all of this buildout of this infrastructure.
So the question is, how are those exposures priced in the market? And I suppose the inconvenient truth for investors is that the large exposures in the benchmark — those factors on the right-hand side of our lever — are also generally more expensive versus their 20-year history. A lot of numbers on this slide, but just to point out what they mean. The box is — let’s call it — the 50 monthly observations over 20 years of how that exposure has been priced relative to the market. Think of the market as being one. And the US at 1.2, its multiple is 20% higher than it’s typically been relative to the market. And it’s bang on the 75th percentile. A little bit cheaper below, a lot cheaper outside of the mega caps, and then if you go across to the other exposures that are expensive, they are those things — obviously it’s quality, it’s growth — they’re above trend. What’s below trend? Well, the humble value factor is below trend. Emerging markets, Europe, these are still below trend and midcaps are cheap relative to large caps. So I think that’s important to note.
We all know the value factor has underperformed in the longer term and certainly over the period of our 10 and a half years of track record. Importantly though, pragmatic value has both beaten the benchmark and the value factor. And why is that? It’s because we are taking — let’s call it — a much more contemporary approach where we’re focusing on paying the right price. I think another issue that is often missed in the market’s mindset when it thinks about returns is the risk that is taken to generate the return. Now, we’re measuring risk as a function of volatility. And what the Sharpe ratio captures is your alpha relative to the volatility of your alpha. And what’s very pleasing in Antipodes’ results across our Global Value Fund and the long-short fund — the Antipodes Global Fund there in lighter blue — is we’re getting very good returns relative to the unit of risk we are taking. In fact, the volatility of our funds over all time periods is lower than the benchmark. And we think that is a key justification for considering pragmatic value as a diversifier for core passive and systematic exposures. Value investing doesn’t need to be cyclical. It doesn’t need to be volatile. It’s a great diversifier for core portfolios. And you can see there’s a very nice pattern of improvement over time periods as our approach to risk management and greater use of quant in our process has also deepened.
So pragmatic value is very simple. It’s paying the right multiple relative to across the spectrum of resilience and growth. We’re agnostic as to those characteristics. We don’t mind low growth, don’t mind high growth. It’s paying the right multiple relative to that growth.
And how do we implement that? We implement it through firstly getting our longer-term industry research, really focusing on what drives competitive advantage in an industry over the very long term and then mapping that to the winners and the losers. Now that is irrespective of whether the industry is more cyclical or more exposed to structural change or more exposed to social macroeconomic change. And what we’re trying to do is take advantage of the market when it starts to become irrational and starts to misprice the change that is impacting a company. So the classic industry cyclical downturn — what you need to be wary of, though, is screening out the value traps, those companies that are not going to come back from the downturn. But we also want to take advantage of structural change, and I’m going to give you an example of each of these.
In terms of also just focusing on how we deliver these results and why this industry-led approach combined with our quant macro toolkit has led to those very low volatile returns relative to alpha — it is this sort of focus on downside protection. Now we have our long-only fund, the Global Value Fund on the left, the long-short fund on the right. Now we’re showing the numbers slightly different to what Dave has just presented. The minus 51 — that means we’re protecting – it’s like for like. So we’re protecting in our long-only fund over three years basically 49% of the downside and we’re getting 113% of the upside. So very good asymmetry in upside capture versus downside protection in just a garden-variety long-only fund.
On the right you can see our long-short. Now, very impressively, in long-short in the last three years we’ve actually had upside in down markets. So that’s why the bar is pointing up with a positive 42%. So that’s very good and it’s part of our focus on driving risk-adjusted returns. And secondly, that industry-led approach ultimately allows us to find much more diversified sources of alpha relative to the benchmark, and that’s so important when the benchmark is concentrated. On the left you can see the top 15 single stock contributors to the benchmark. There’s a lot of light blue and dark blue — that is the — let’s call it — the tech AI enabler trade. And then on the right side we have a much more colourful rainbow, which is our fund, our long fund returns, which are much more diversified by sector, by region and by market cap. A lot less dependent on tech, the US or mega caps. And that’s a good place to be, I would argue. And we think it’s a good place to be because markets are going to continue to broaden. Why? What’s the case for broadening out? Well, look, it’s already started. In spite of all the hype and headlines around AI and Nvidia, the market last year — emerging markets, Europe and value — outperformed the US and outperformed the mega caps. So under the hood the market is broadening. Why is it broadening? We think it’s broadening because there’s a major shift happening in western economies away from consumption towards investment. Anyone who’s ever experienced travel to a major Chinese city like Shanghai versus the experience in London, Paris, New York — there’s clearly a need for western governments to upgrade infrastructure, whether it’s social infrastructure, physical infrastructure, defence, catch up to China on energy transition — all these things will mean a rationing of consumption. And if you look at the stock market, the market cap is in consumption, it’s not in investment, and that shift is going to be very painful for the benchmark and it’s going to be very painful for benchmark-like portfolios. So it has started, and I’m going to give you an example of each of these types of change that we’re taking advantage of in our portfolios.
So, SLB — formerly known as Schlumberger — is the leader in the oil service industry, and oil services is a classic cyclical long-term downturn. Any oil service company that was less exposed to shale — almost all of our incremental production came out of the US shale patch — setting the scene over the past 10 years. And the companies that were exposed to offshore deepwater drilling, they suffered a very painful 10-year downturn. Now, what we’re seeing now is those companies in the shale patch are more focused on cash flow and dividends. And because of the geological nature of oil production, you have to invest to stand still. Now that investment is now switching back to offshore. And so we have a company that is on 17 times with depressed earnings at the beginning of a very long-term recovery. It’s a technology leader and it sells in terms of production — it basically has a lot of proprietary data and it resells insights that it has from that data back to its customers. And those AI tools — as you can see there — their digital business has double the average corporate margin and is growing rapidly. So we have a winner from a cyclical change. It’s also a great example, I think, of AI adoption that’s mispriced.
A stock that all of you will know as one of the great winners during the SaaS bubble, the COVID SaaS bubble — Salesforce. It’s funny how a sector goes from being hero to zero in a relatively short period of time — three years. You know, companies like Zoom, Salesforce and HubSpot, these were must-own portfolios. They didn’t really trade on earnings, they traded on revenue multiples. The good news now is they’re trading on P/Es, and they’re a great opportunity, I think, to take advantage of irrationality around a structural change, which is AI. There is a perception that because the cost of coding has collapsed, incumbent software companies’ valuations need to be recalibrated. We think that misses the point of what these companies are.
That would be like saying Instagram’s not worth much anymore because the code that backs up Instagram can just be replicated at a lower price. That’s not what drives value — it’s the network effect. And the network effect in enterprise software is very strong. I mean, these companies own their customers. What does software do? It sets the rules of running the business. Large language models are probabilistic in nature. No one wants to have their wage paid on a probabilistic basis. You want to get paid on the right date and the right amount, and that’s what enterprise software does. So we’re getting a unique opportunity to buy relatively high-growth companies at multiples at a discount relative to that growth. Salesforce in fact is on a P/E of 14.5 and we think it can sustainably grow at around 14% per annum.
Our final example is a socioeconomic beneficiary of change. Nothing is more predictable than aging. And what we’re seeing here is that in the US, aged care is basically a private-pay market. So it has much lower regulatory risk versus, say, what we have here in this country. Number one. Number two, you can see the yellow columns versus the blue columns. Yellow is demand, blue is supply. Why is supply so challenged? Because rents today are below the replacement cost — developers can’t make money out of developing new aged care supply. The first baby boomers have just turned 80. By 2030, the demand for aged care will double in the US and we’re not even meeting the demand today. So we’re at the beginning of an enormous pricing cycle. And in Brookdale, we’ve got a company that trades at a third of the multiple of the industry leader, which is Welltower, at 10 times the EV to EBITDA. It’s just appointed a new CEO who just so happens to be a former Navy Top Gun pilot, which I think is pretty cool.
So in summary, the tilt in our portfolio from a regional perspective is that we’re overweight Europe, but in companies that are generally multinationals. We’re overweight Asia EM, and that is a place where quality — which is an expensive factor — is actually quite cheap, and we’re more exposed to domestic-facing companies. And then we’re underweight North America, generally in technology, especially in semiconductor stocks. We’re positioning for AI adoption in North America rather than extrapolating the current buildout. And then in the defensive leg of the portfolio we have our healthcare and infrastructure plays, our structural trends where we’re positioning for the winners of tomorrow, and then the more cyclical part of our portfolio where we’re really screening out the value traps.
So just to finish up — we really believe pragmatic value is a great diversifier for core portfolios. The delivery of diversified sources of alpha with downside protection is a great complement for passive and core.


